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like" was deemed reasonable, as they tend to present urban
problems. 170
The New York Court of Appeals subsequently invalidated a
similar ordinance on state due process grounds. 17 1 The New
York court found that "restricting occupancy of single-family
housing based on the biological or legal relationships between its
inhabitants bears no reasonable relationship" to the legitimate
goals of zoning legislation. 172 In order not to "exclude any
households that due process requires be included" such an
ordinance must contain an "alternative definition of family"
which would include "any number of unrelated persons living
together" as the "functional equivalent of a traditional
family. "173
Thus, the New York State Constitution provides protection under its due process clause that is not available under the parallel
provision in the Federal Constitution.
SUPREME COURT
ALBANY COUNTY
174
Quirk v. Regan

(decided January 15, 1991)

Non-judicial state court employees 17 5 challenged the constitu170. Id.

171. See McMinn, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128
(1985).
172. Id. at 549, 488 N.E.2d at 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
173. Id. at 550, 488 N.E.2d at 1243-44, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 132 (citing
Group House of Port Washington, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d at 272-73, 380 N.E.2d at

210, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 380; City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300,
305-06, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974)).

174. 565 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1991).
175. Id. at 423. Petitioners were the collective bargaining representatives of

the state court employees. Id. In addition, other labor organizations
representing non-judicial employees of the New York State Court system
brought a claim to federal court asserting that chapter 190 was unconstitutional
under the contracts clause of the United States Constitution. Association of
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tionality of section 375 of chapter 190 of the Laws of 1990,176
which allowed the state to withhold fourteen days of wages
earned by non-judicial state court employees who were hired after
1982. The Albany County Supreme Court held that the statute
was violative of the employees' due process rights guaranteed
under the state 17 7 and federal17 8 constitutions. 17 9

In 1982, a labor agreement between the state and non-judicial
state court employees called for wages to be withheld for every
Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters within City of New York v. New
York, 749 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 940 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 936 (1992).
176. Act of May 25, 1990, ch. 190, 1990 N.Y. Laws 369, 587
(McKinney). Section 375 of chapter 190 provides:
b. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision a of this section
or of section 200 of the state finance law, commencing with the last biweekly payroll period ending at least fourteen days before March 31,
1991 for each nonjudicial officer or employee, the salary or wages of
such officer or employee shall be payable by the state two weeks after
they shall have become due. Until such time, an alternative procedure
for the payment of salaries and wages, to be determined by the
comptroller, may be implemented in lieu of the procedure specified in
subdivision 1 of such section 200 or in other provisions of law. The
procedure set forth in this paragraph (including any alternative
procedure determined by the comptroller) shall remain in effect until the
state and an employee organization representing nonjudicial officers and
employees who are in positions which are in collective negotiating units
established pursuant to article 14 of the civil service law enter into
agreement providing otherwise for the payment of salaries and wages to
such officers and employees.
(2) The provisions of paragraph 1 of this subdivision shall not
apply to any alternative procedure for the payment of salaries and wages
to nonjudicial officers and employees that was adopted pursuant to law
and in effect immediately preceding the effective date of this
subdivision.
Id.
177. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
179. Quirk, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 425. In addition, the court held that chapter
190 violated article I, section 17 of the New York State Constitution, which
guarantees the right to organize and bargain collectively. Id. Article I section
17 provides in pertinent part: "Employees shall have the right to organize and
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 17.
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tenth day of work. 180 In 1990, the state legislature passed chapter
190 which permitted the state to withhold the state court employees' wages earned on every ninth day, resulting in fourteen days
of wages withheld for the year. Therefore, these employees
would be paid for fifty weeks while working fifty-two weeks.
Chapter 190 implies that the state could withhold wages indefinitely by not specifying a time period for reimbursement. 181
The non-judicial state court employees claimed that, along with
being violative of the state and federal due process guarantees,
this provision violated section 209-a of the state's Civil Service
Law which provides, in substance, that the state employer cannot
modify a labor agreement without good faith negotiations. 182
Respondents, Edward V. Regan, Comptroller of the State of New
York and Matthew T. Crosson, Chief Administrator of the
Courts of the Unified Court System of the State of New York,
claimed that the state legislature had the right to modify the labor
agreement without collective bargaining due to state fiscal problems. 183 To support their claim, respondents relied upon SubwaySurface Supervisors Ass'n v. New York City TransitAuthority. 184
In Subway-Surface, the court of appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the New York State Financial Emergency Act
for the City of New York which called for wage deferment
without collective bargaining. 185
The Albany County Supreme Court determined, however, that
the fiscal condition in the case at bar did not rise to the level of
the financial crises confronted by the court of appeals in Subway180. Act of June 21, 1982, ch. 353, 1982 N.Y. Laws 901 (McKinney).
181. Quirk, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 424-25.
182. Id. at 423. Section 209-a of the state's Civil Service Law provides in
part:

It shall be an improper practice for a public employer or its agents
deliberately

. .

. (d) to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly

recognized or entitled representatives of its public employees; or (e) to
refuse to continue all the terms of an expired agreement until a new
agreement is negotiated ....

N.Y. Civ. SwRV. LAW § 209-a(1) (McKinney 1983).
183. Quirk, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24.
184. 44 N.Y.2d 101, 375 N.E.2d 384, 404 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1978).
185. Id. at 106-07, 375 N.E.2d at 386, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
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Surface. According to the supreme court, "[t]here is no proclamation in the subject legislation declaring the existence of a financial crises." ' 186 Furthermore, the court noted that in the
Subway-Surface case, the payments were only deferred and later
paid, while in the case at bar these payments were deferred indefinitely.
Addressing the state and federal due process claims, the court
ruled that section 375 of chapter 190 of the Laws of 1990 was
unconstitutional because it deprived the non-judicial state court
employees of wages without due process of law. 187 The court
noted that "[t]he concept in confiscating the public employees
wages to meet the government's emergency must be crucial and
of the highest importance." ' 188 Here, the court found that the
state failed to meet this burden.
Aside from the holding that chapter 190 was unconstitutional
on state and federal due process grounds, the supreme court also
found that the provision was violative of article I, section 17 of
the New York State Constitution. 189 The court found that "[t]o
withhold and keep the wages of the working person is repugnant
to those rights guaranteed under the State Constitution." 190 Here,
the court determined that chapter 190 violated this provision because it usurped the state employees' right to organize and bargain collectively.
186. Quirk, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
187. Id. at 425.

188. Id.
189. Id. Section 17 of article I provides:
Labor of human beings is not a commodity nor an article of
commerce and shall never be so considered or construed.
No laborer, workman or mechanic, in the employ of a contractor or
subcontractor engaged in the performance of any public work, shall be
permitted to work more than eight hours in any day or more than five
days in any week, except in cases of extraordinary emergency; nor shall
be paid less than the rate of wages prevailing in the same trade or
occupation in the locality within the state where such public work is to

be situated, erected or used.
Employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain

collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17.
190. Id. at 425.
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The United States Supreme Court, in United States Trust Co. of
New York v. New Jersey,19 1 stated that state contracts can be
constitutionally impaired under the Contract Clause1 92 if "that
impairment was both reasonable and necessary to serve the admittedly important purposes claimed by the State." ' 193 The Court
noted that impairment of a state contract is reasonable, provided
the parties failed, at the time of contracting, to foresee the
possibility of changed circumstances. 194 The Court further
explained that impairment of a state contract is necessary as long
as the state could not have adopted alternative means of achieving
their goal. 195
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was confronted with the constitutionality of chapter 190 in
light of the Contract Clause and held that the provision was
unconstitutional. 196 Applying the United States Trust test, the
Second Circuit found that the state could find other alternative
means to finance the expansion of the New York court system. 197
According to the Second Circuit, "[t]he state could have shifted
the seven million dollars from another governmental program, or
8
it could have raised taxes." 19
Similarly, in Quirk, the Albany County Supreme Court apparently believed that the state failed to meet the standard announced
in United States Trust. The court noted: "Why a subsequent legislative body may by amendment nullify a previous contractual
debt of the State is beyond comprehension. The State having
made those appropriations as to the period covering the method
of payments may not subsequently cancel a contractual obliga191. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
192. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall .. pass any Bill of
Attainder, aT post facto law, or Law impairing the obligation of Contracts
193. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 29.
194. Id. at 31.
195. Id. at 30.
196. See Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters Within
City of New York v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 774 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 936 (1992).
197. Id. at 773.
198. Id.
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9

tion. " 19
In conclusion, the Quirk court found that section 375 of chapter
190 was violative of both the state and federal due process
provisions. In addition to the due process violations, the court
further found that the statute was violative of the state
constitution provision guaranteeing that the state will collectively
bargain with a union. 200 The Federal Constitution has no equivalent provision that explicitly provides for the state to collectively
bargain with a union. The Federal Constitution has, however, a
Contract Clause which guarantees that the state will not breach its
contracts. As previously mentioned, the Second Circuit, in
Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters within
the City, applying the Contract Clause, similarly found section
375 of chapter 190 to be unconstitutional.
NEW YORK COUNTY
1
Hope v. Perales 20

(decided April 15, 1991)

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Prenatal
Care Assistance Program (PCAP)2 02 as violative of the rights of
pregnant eligible women, 20 3 because it did not provide funds for
eligible women for whom an abortion is medically necessary.
The court found that "[t]he right of a pregnant woman to choose
an abortion in circumstances where it is medically indicated is
one component of the right of privacy rooted in the due process
clause of the New York State Constitution. ' ' 2 04 Therefore, the
court held that PCAP's exclusion of funding for medically
necessary abortions was unconstitutional under the due process
clause, 20 5 the equal protection clause 206 and sections 1 and 3 of
199. Quirk, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 424.

200.
201.
1991).
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 425.
150 Misc. 2d 985, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. New York County
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2520-2529 (McKinney 1992).
Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 986-87, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
Id. at 993-94, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
Id. at 997, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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